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This 10 page paper examines the evolution of U.S. intelligence gather operations during and after World War II. Bibliography lists 6 sources.
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10 pages (~225 words per page)
File: KV32_HVusspys.rtf
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War II and how they have evolved. Discussion Today there is a bewildering array of Intelligence agencies within the U.S. government; an alphabet soup of covert operators: CIA, FBI, DIA,
DNI, DOE, etc. But during World War II, the U.S. covert intelligence agency most recognized was called the Office of Strategic Services (OSS); it eventually morphed into the CIA after
the war. Since it does seem to be the model for later agencies, this paper concentrates on the OSS. Before the Second World War, there was no central intelligence-gathering agency
in the U.S. government; instead, intelligence gathering was traditionally left to "the principal executors of American foreign policy, the Department of State and the armed services" (Warner, COI came first,
2000). The State Departments intelligence came from its diplomats and attach?s, who usually obtained it in their ordinary course of dealing with diplomats from other countries, although they sometimes did
have secret meetings with agents (Warner, COI came first, 2000). In Washington, information coming in from the field went across the desks of the various branches of the service, such
as the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Military Intelligence Division of what was then called the War Department; this organization is better known as G-2 (Warner, COI came
first, 2000). At times, the information went all the way up to the White House, but short of that, no one at any of the lower levels tried to collate
or assess this information (Warner, COI came first, 2000). Instead, the State Department and the various services each developed their own procedures, which led diplomat Robert Murphy to observe "it
must be confessed that our Intelligence organization in 1940 was primitive and inadequate. It was timid, parochial, and operating strictly in the tradition of the Spanish-American War" (Warner, COI came
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