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Essay / Research Paper Abstract
This 4-page paper examines NASA and its resistance to change following the 2003 Columbia shuttle disaster. Bibliography lists 4 sources.
Page Count:
4 pages (~225 words per page)
File: AS43_MTnasachan.rtf
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Unformatted sample text from the term paper:
thermal insulation foam that broke off the tank and clipped one of the crafts wings. But the following inquiry showed deeper problems, namely a NASA organizational structure that helped create
the problem. The post-accident Columbia Accident Inquiry Board (CAIB) was massively critical of the organizations role in the accident, pointing out, for example, that the shuttle program had a history
of foam anomalies; with damaged created by debris occurring on every shuttle flight, and most missions seeing insulating foam shedding during takeoff (CAIB). "This raises an obvious question," the report
says, "why did NASA continue flying the Shuttle with a known problem that violated design requirements?" (CAIB). The report answers this in the conclusion section of Chapter 5, namely that
foam-shedding and other debris impacts were more of maintenance than engineering issue, and not hazardous to either vehicle or crew (CAIB). The
lack of concern over things like shedding foam insulation is indicative of an organization that is set in its ways, and that makes assumptions based on the old way of
doing things. In fact, NASA was change resistant from the individual and organizational side and its not certain if even recommendations from the CAIB can break through.
For example, right after the CAIB issued its report, Sean OKeefe, the NASA administrator at the time, publically accepted all recommendations, but did not believe that
the NASA culture was "broken," and didnt require much in the way of change (James, 2007). However, NASA did accept the suggestions
and "attempted to implement change" (James, 2007, p. 14). Some of the implementations were somewhat successful (the two remaining shuttles havent exploded nor has there been loss of life). However,
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